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SILENCE AS INCRIMINATION IN FEDERAL COURTS
It is desirable that the rules governing the admissibility of evidence in federal criminal cases be uniform throughout the federal
system, so that prosecutions under a federal statute will not result
in a verdict of guilty in one court and an acquittal in another when
the same fact situation is presented.' Therefore the determination of
admissibility must be different from the practice in civil cases,
where either the local or federal rule is applied depending upon
which rule most favors admissibility. 2 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure 3 provides that the admissibility of evidence
is to be governed by the principles of the common law as interpreted
by the federal courts in the light of reason and experience. This is
a codification of the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in
19334 and 1934,5 which overturned the former practice of looking
to the local rules of evidence."
Even before adoption of Rule 26, the federal courts did not rely
on local rules in the area of adoptive admissions, or admissions by
silence,7 but applied reason to the common law in determining admissibility. The majority developed a rule based primarily on
federal decisions without respect for state lines,8 and did not hesitate
to use decisions of state courts in other circuits as authority.9 The
cases have been predominantly concerned with adoptive admissions
occurring after the arrest of the accused. The conflict that exists in
the federal courts at present 0 is due largely to the failure of the
Supreme Court to set standards for the lower federal courts.
1. Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules, Fed. R. Crim. P. 26,
18 U. S. C. following § 3771 (1952).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) ; Boerner v. United States, 117 F. 2d 387, 391
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 587 (1941).
3. 327 U. S. 821, 852 (1946). Rule 26 became effective March 21, 1946.
4. Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371 (1933) ; see 18 Minn. L. Rev.
893 (1934).
5. Wolf v. United States, 291 U. S. 7, 12-13 (1934) ; see Dession,

The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 Yale L. J. 694, 703-704
(1946).
6. Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 379 (1933). For a history of

the federal rules of evidence in criminal cases, see Howard, Evidence iit
Federal Criminal Trials, 51 Yale L. J. 763 (1952).
7. See, e.g., Hauger v. United States, 173 Fed. 54 (4th Cir. 1909).
8. See e.g., United States v. Harris, 45 F. 2d 690 (2d Cir. 1930).
9. See, e.g., Graham v. United States, 15 F. 2d 740 (8th Cir. 1926),
cert. denied, 274 U. S. 743 (1927) ; Hauger v. United States, 173 Fed. 54
(4th Cir. 1909) ; Sorenson v. United States, 168 Fed. 785 (8th Cir. 1909).
10. See Fraenkel, From Suspicion to Accusation, 51 Yale L. J. 748,
753 n. 29 (1942).
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NOTES
TEE GENERAL RULE OF ADOPTIVE ADmissIoNs

The general rule of silence as incrimination is based on the
presumption that ordinarily, when an innocent person is accused of
a crime he vill naturally deny the charge. If a person does not deny
such an accusation, but remains silent, he is deemed to have
assented to its correctness, and the accusatory statement together
with the fact of silence is admissible in evidence against him."' If
the accusation is denied, it is never admissible as an admission,'- but
it may still be admissible for another purpose.'8 The present majority rule in the federal courts is that no inference of assent can
be drawn from the silence of the accused person if he was under
arrest at the time the accusation was made.' 4 Even before this rule
was established, and the fact of arrest was not considered important,'5 failure to respond to testimony given at a hearing before
an examining magistrate was not admissible because it was improper
to allow an inference against the defendant from his failure to
answer.' 6 Several of the states follow the present majority rule of
the federal courts.' 7 Other states'8 and the courts of the District of
Columbia' 9 place no significance on the fact of arrest, and some of
to overcome the
the federal courts allow special circumstances
20
right to remain silent while under arrest.
The question whether the fact of arrest per se should render
evidence of silence inadmissible can be settled for better or worse by
a rule of thumb, but other problems are not so easily put to rest.
The problem arises whether the judge or jury shall decide if circumstances are present which could lead to an inference of assent.
11. Egan v. United States, 137 F. 2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 320
U. S. 788 (1943) ; Graham v. United States, 15 F. 2d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 1926),

cert. denied, 274 U. S. 743 (1927) (dictum).
12. Amezaga v. United States, 296 Fed. 915 (5th Cir. 1924).

13. See D! Carlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

268 U. S. 706 (1925).

14. See United States v. L. Biondo, 135 F. 2d 130 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Yep
v. United States, 83 F. 2d 41 (10th Cir. 1936) ; McCarthy v. United States,

25 F. 2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928).
15. See Sparf and Hanson v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 56 (1895)
(dictum); Miller v. Territory, 19 Pac. 50, 3 Wash. Terr. 554 (1888).
16. United States v. Brown, 24 Fed. Cas. 1247, No. 14660 (D.C. Cir.
1835).
17. E.g., State v. Bates, 140 Conn. 326, 99 A. 2d 133 (1953) ; People V.
Rutigliano, 261 N. Y. 103, 104-107, 184 N. E. 689, 689-690 (1933) (dictum).
18. E.g., State v. Picciotti, 12 N. J. 205, 209-210, 96 A. 2d 406, 408-409
(1953) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Hall, 173 Pa. Super 285, 290, 98 A. 2d
386, 389 (1953) (dictum).
19. Dickerson v. United States, 65 F. 2d 824 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U. S. 665 (1953).
20. See Rocchia v. United States, 78 F. 2d 966 (9th Cir. 1935) ; McCarthy v. United States, 25 F. 2d 298, 299 (6th Cir. 1928) (dictum).
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It must also be determined which of the parties has the burden of
proving the existence of circumstances from which the inference
of assent or non-assent could be drawn. As Wigmore points out,
each case must be decided in view of its own peculiar circumstances,
and most of the rulings on admissibility cannot serve as precedents. 21 However, each case involves a determination of whether
judge or jury should evaluate the various factors that must necessarily be considered in deciding whether, under the circumstances,
the accused's silence can be treated as an adoption of the incriminating statements. When the evidence is erroneously admitted, it
must be decided whether such error is prejudicial, and if it can be
cured by instructions to the jury.
THE FACT OF ARREST

Sparf and Hanson v. United States,2 2 decided in 1895, is the
only case in which the Supreme Court expressly considered the
propriety of admitting evidence showing self incrimination by
silence. The defendant, a seaman, was being returned to the United
States in chains under the charge of murdering his superior officer
on the high seas. When a co-defendant made statements in his
presence which incriminated both of them, he remained silent. The
court considered the statements and the fact of his silence admissible because ".. . they appear to have been made in his presence
and under such circumstances as would warrant the inference that
he would naturally have contradicted them if he did not assent to
their truth." 3 In all succeding cases in which the problem has
arisen, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, 24 or has decided
the case on other grounds. 25 As recently as 1933, the Circuit Court
for the District of Columbia relied on Sparf as authority for admitting in evidence incriminatory silence that occurred while the
26
accused was under arrest.
In 1909 the Fourth Circuit said this about testimony showing
silence in the face of an accusation: ". . . he was under arrest, and
may not have felt that he was at liberty to speak."2 7 Since that time,
the doctrine that an accused person under arrest can remain silent
21.

4 Wigmore Evidence § 1072 (3d ed. 1940).

22. 156 U. S. 51 (1895).

23. Id. at 56.
24. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 65 F. 2d 824 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 U. S. 665 (1933) ; Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U. S. 746 (1925).

25. See United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd,
343 U. S. 747 (1952).
26. See Dickerson v. United States, 65 F. 2d 824 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 U. S. 665 (1933).
27. Hauger v. United States, 173 F. 2d 54, 60 (4th Cir. 1909).
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without incriminating himself has grown to have the force of law,
and, with variations, it is followed by all of the circuits where the
problem has arisen28 except the District of Columbia.
The courts of the District of Columbia are included within the
scope of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,20- and therefore
would be expected to be subject to the provisions of Rule 26 along
with the rest of the federal courts. In Griffin v. UnitedStates," however, the Supreme Court expressly conceded to the courts of the
District of Columbia free rein to develop their own rules of evidence without interference or supervision-in the absence of specific
Congressional legislation-perhaps because the circuit court of the
District could be compared with a state supreme court in its rule
making power. The cases from the District of Columbia involving
silence as incrimination have dealt largely with prosecutions for
violations of local statutes, so that there was no need for conformity
with other circuits. 1 In one case involving a federal crime, the
circut court, by way of dictum, expressed doubt about the admissibility of the defendant's silence in the face of an incriminatory state,ment made while he was under arrest, 2 - but gave no indication that it
was influenced by the fact that the statute violated was a federal
one. The language of the Supreme Court in Griffin implies that the
courts of the District are also free to apply their own evidentiary
rules in cases involving federal statutes, even if those rules are at
odds with the rules for the other circuits as propounded by the
Supreme Court. 33
Although some courts of the District of Columbia have expressed doubts about their conflict with the majority rule,3' Judge
28. See note 14 supra.
29. Fed.R. Crim. P. 54(a).

30. 336 U. S.704 (1949).

31. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United, 65 F. 2d 824 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U. S. 665 (1933), (murder) ; United States v. Peckham, 105 F. Supp. 775
(D. D.C. 1952), red on other grounds, 210 F. 2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953)

(abortion).

32. See Skiskowsld v. United States, 158 F. 2d 177, 182 (D.C. Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S.882 (1947).
33. "This Court, in its decisions, and Congress, in its ... statutes, have
often recognized the appropriateness of one rule for the District and another

for other jurisdictions so far as they are subject to federal law." Griffin v.
United States, 336 U. S.704, 712 (1949).

34. See Skiskowski v. United States, 158 F. 2d 177, 182 (D.C. Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S. 822 (1947); United States v. Kelly, 119 F.
Supp. 217, 222 (D. D.C. 1954) (dictum).
The Municipal Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia apparently

would follow the majority federal rule, see Wilson v. District of Columbia,
65 A. 2d 214, 216 (Mun. Ct. App. D. C. 1949) (dictum), even though it is
expressly excluded from the scope of the Federal Rules in misdemeanor trials.

Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules, Note to Subdivision 54(a) (2),
ff 3, 18 U. S. C.following § 3771 (1952).
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Holtzoff said in 1952, in upholding the admissibility of evidence of
the defendant's express refusal to make a statement while under
arrest, that "He had a right to decline to make a statement, but I
do not think that there was any error in permitting the jury to know
that this was his attitude."35 However, two years later, in a similar
case where the accused also expressly refused to answer an accusation, the district court held testimony of that fact to be inadmissible,
because the court reasoned that the defendant's statements 9 were
an assertion of his legal right to refuse to make a statement.,"
The courts of the other circuits have realistically and logically recognized the right to remain silent when under arrest without an express claim of that right. 38 The distinction between silence and an
express refusal to answer favors the experienced criminal over the
innocent and inexperienced accused person who, being unacquainted
with the niceties of the rules of evidence, entertains the popular
belief that he has the right to remain silent. In contrast to Judge
Holtzoff's statement in 1952 is the vehement condemnation of the
use of such evidence in Helton v. United States,39 a recent case from
the Fifth Circuit:
"Under our law it is not the function of police officers to determine for the benefit of the jury whether or not a person under
arrest on suspicion of crime has given a sufficient explanation,
or any explanation at all, and the fact that the accused here remained silent rather than risk uhwitting distortion of his statement by a police officer at a later date does not give in law, and
should 0 not be allowed to give in fact, rise to an inference of
guilt." 4

Some of the federal courts allow special circumstances to override the general rule that no inference of assent to an accusation can
be drawn from silence when accused is under arrest. 4 1 Thus, in
Rocchia v. United States,42 the court said that ". . . a statement by

35. United States v. Peckham, 105 F. Supp 775 776 (D. D.C. 1952),

rev'd on other grounds, 210 F. 2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953). When arrested on a
charge of abortion, the defendant was asked if he had anything to say. He replied, "No statement."
36. When confronted with a co-defendant's confession implicating him,
the defendant said, "... 'I'll tell my story to my lawyer,' and 'I have nothing
to say at this time,' . . ." United States v. Kelly, 119 F. Supp. 217, 221
(D. D.C. 1954).
37. Id. at 222.
38. E.g., Helton v. United States, 221 F. 2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955) ; McCarthy v. United States, 25 F. 2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928).
39. 221 F. 2d 338 (5th Cir. 1955).
40. Id. at 342.
41. See note 18 supra. According to Wigmore, the better rule is to
allow flexibility according to the circumstances rather than categorically to
exclude such evidence. 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1072 (3d ed. 1940).
42. 78 F. 2d 966 (9th Cir. 1935).
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one officer to his superior, in the presence of the defendant, that
there had been an attempt made by the defendant while in his
custody to secure his release by bribery, calls for reply from the
defendant, and that his silence in regard thereto would be admissible in evidence" 43 This rule would seem to invite reversals
because in reviewing the determination of admissibility, the appellate
court must pass on the sufficiency of the circumstances to take the
case outside of the general rule.44 Furthermore, the rule casts an
undue burden on the accused, who must make an instantaneous
appraisal of the circumstances and decide whether to risk incriminating himself in the course of a denial or to risk producing evidence against himself by silence in case the court, after a leisurely
study of the circumstances in retrospect, decides that he should
have spoken up.
DETERMINING ADMISSIBILITY

Wigmore is of the opinion that all that need be shown to render
the evidence admissible is that the incriminating statement was made
in the accused's presence and that he remained silent.' 5 Under this
view, it may either be assumed, or left to the jury to determine, that
the accused actually heard the statement, that he understood it, and
that it naturally called for a reply. This rule would place the burden
on the defendant of proving the negative, which could be difficult.
However, the federal courts, with the exception of the District
of Columbia,4 6 have generally accepted the rule that before the
evidence is admissible the prosecution must demonstrate that the
accused actually heard the statement, 47 but it need not have been
.addressed to him.'4 It is error to allow the jury to determine whether
the defendant heard or understood the accusatory statement when
there is uncontradicted testimony that he did not understand the
language,49 or was semi-conscious at the time. ° A person cannot
43. Id. at 972.
44. See United States v. Harris, 45 F. 2d 690 (2d Cir. 1930).
45. 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1071 (3d ed. 1940).
46. Brown v. United States, 32 F. 2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1929) ; Harrod v.
United States, 29 F. 2d 454 (D.C. Cir. 1928). See also Sorenson v. United
States, 168 Fed. 785, 808 (8th Cir. 1909) (dissenting opinion). Professor
Wigniore would asmne from the party's presence that he heard and understood. 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1072 (3d ed. 1940).
47. Hauger v. United States, 173 Fed. 54 (4th Cir. 1909) ; Sorenson v.
United States, 168 Fed. 785 (8th Cir. 1909).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 85 F. 2d 544 (2d Cir.), cert.
dentied, 299 U. S. 609 (1936) ; Rocchia v. United States, 78 F. 2d 966 (9th Cir.

1935).

49. Kalos v. United States, 9 F. 2d 268 (8th Cir. 1925).
50. Cf. Gowen v. Bush, 76 Fed. 349, 353 (8th Cir. 1896) (a civil case).
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be expected to deny a statement when he does not have knowledge to enable him to know whether it is true or false. 1 Furthermore, failure to reply to an incriminatory letter raises no inference
of assent to the truthfulness of its contents,5 2 since it is unreasonable
to assume that a person will always take the trouble to write a letter
in answer to a false accusation.
Where adoptive admissions are sought to be entered in evidence.
the trial judge must first consider the circumstances surrounding the
event and determine whether the jury could reasonably reach a
conclusion adverse to the defendant. Judge Learned Hand has
taken the position that the mere fact than an accusation was made
in the defendant's presence cannot raise an inference that the
accused adopted the statement as his own, but there must be a
further showing that the accused assented. In the same opinion,
the testimony of persons present at the time the accusation was
made, as to the contents of that accusation, was held admissible as a
prior consistent statement made before there was any motive to
falsify, 54 but this cannot justify admitting evidence of the defendant's response. Under the rule that places the burden of showing
more than the fact of silence on the prosecution, it must, in order
to render the evidence admissible, demonstrate to the judge that the
accused heard and understood the statement, and that he should
have replied under the circumstances. When a mere showing of
silence is sufficient, the burden is shifted to the defendant, who
must convince the judge that he did not hear or understand, or that
the circumstances were such that he was not required to deny the
accusation, 5 and if the judge cannot be persuaded, the defendant
must explain away his silence to the satisfaction of the jury.
51. See United States v. Dellaro, 99 F. 2d 781 (2d Cir. 1938). Wigmorc
would disregard the defendant's knowledge, in admitting the evidence, because of the general rule that a party's admission is receivable irrespective of
his personal knowledge. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1072 (3d ed. 1940).
52. E.g., Poy Coon Tom v. United States, 7 F. 2d 109 (9th Cir. 1925);
Packer v. United States, 106 Fed. 906 (2d Cir. 1901). But cf. Simons v.
United States, 119 F. 2d 539, 555-556 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 314 U. S. 616
(1941) (defendant tore up the letter, and told witness to tear up his copy) ;
Rumble v. United States, 143 Fed. 772 (9th Cir. 1906) (part of a larger
correspondence).
53. See Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364, 366 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 268 U. S. 706 (1925).
54. Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F. 2d 364, 366 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
268 U. S. 706 (1925). It would not seem to matter whether or not the defendant had denied the statement.
55. The silence can always be explained away by showing that silence
was due to causes other than assent 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1072 (3d cd.
1940).
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CORRECTiON OF ERROR BY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

The federal courts have sometimes erroneously admitted evi-

dence of the accused's silence while under arrest, and have tried to
correct'the error by striking the testimony from the record,50 or by
instructions to the jury.5 Either method would seem to be sufficient
to cure the error, but doubt has been expressed that the error can
be cured at all.5s1 When curative instructions are not given, the
effect of the evidence on the jury cannot be evaluated, and the
defendant is usually entitled to a new trial,59 even if the other evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the conviction. 0
If the evidence is introduced without objection, and no motion
to strike is made nor instructions requested to the effect that the
evidence be disregarded, the objection is considered to be waived,61
andno error results from allowing the jury to consider the evidence.
But even if the defendant has made no objection or motion to
strike, the trial judge must, at the risk of committing reversible
error, 62 give requested instructions to disregard testimony showing
the accused's silence while under arrest. When the incriminatory
silence has been properly admitted the jury is instructed that it
must resolve all doubts in favor of the defendant in determining
whether he actually assented to the statement by his silence. 63 However, a conviction can be based upon evidence of an adoptive admission even if the evidence would have been excluded if proper
objection had been made. "
In On Lee v. United States,65 the circuit court was unanimous in
deciding that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of the
defendant's silence while under arrest, but Judge Frank dissented
from the proposition that the error was cured by the charge to the
jury." The trial judge charged the jury that if the defendant had
denied the crime before arrest, the jury should disregard the fact
56. See Miller v. United States, 21 F. 2d 32, 36 (8th Cir. 1927), cert.
denied, 276 U. S. 621 (1928).
57. See United States v. Chiarella, 184 F. 2d 903, 910 (2d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U. S. 956 (1951).
58. See United States v. On Lee, 193 F. 2d 306, 318-319 (2d Cir. 1951),
aff'd, 343 U. S. 747 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
59. See McCarthy v. United States, 25 F. 2d 298 (6th Cir. 1928).
60. See Helton v. United States, 221 F. 2d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1955).
61. Reavis v. United States, 106 F. 2d 982 (10th Cir. 1939) ; Price v.
United States, 5 F. 2d 650 (6th Cir. 1925).
62. LoBiondo v. United States, 135 F. 2d 130 (2d Cir. 1943).
63. See Dickerson v. United States, 65 F. 2d 824, 827 (D.C. Cir.), cer.
denied, 290 U. S. 665 (1933).
64, See Price v. United States, 5 F. 2d 650 (6th Cir. 1925).
65. 193 F. 2d306 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U. S.747 (1952).
66. See id. at 318-319 (dissenting opinion).
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of his silence when later accused.67 There was evidence that the
defendant had previously asserted his innocence, but not that he
had done so before arrest. 68 Therefore, it was possible for the jury
to use the silence as incrimination consistent with the instructions,
or to disbelieve the evidence that the defendant had in fact previously denied guilt, and infer his assent to the subsequent accusation from his silence. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the conviction was affirmed in a five to four decision.09 The majority
opinion discussed only the more dramatic assignment of error-the
use of a hidden radio transmitter to obtain damaging evidence.
None of the dissenting opinions mentioned the assignment of error
regarding the admission in evidence of the defendant's silence,
although the issue was sharply defined and argued in the parties'
briefs to the Court.70
Several possible conclusions can be drawn from the failure of
the Supreme Court to mention the issue of silence as incrimination
in On Lee. The Court may have concluded that there was no error
in admitting the evidence; that if there was error the instruction
to the jury remedied it; or that even if there was error in the instruction to the jury, it was not prejudicial because the government's
case was so.strong in other respects that the erroneous evidence
was unimportant, and could not have affected the jury's decision.
The major issue in the case was perhaps more important than a
rule of evidence, and the dissenters may have believed it desirable
to devote their whole opinions to the basic issue even though they
may have believed that there was error in admitting the evidence
of silence. Whatever the purpose of the Supreme Court in refusing
to mention the adoptive admission issue, the result is certain. It is
continued diversity where there should be uniformity. Sparf and
Hanson still stands as a sole pronouncement of the Supreme Court
for the courts of the District of Columbia to cite as authority. Despite the autonomy of the District of Columbia in making rules of
evidence, its coufts c6uld hardly Maintain their present position in
the face of a statement from the Supreme Court, even if it were only
dictum, that silence while under arrest can give rise to no inference
against the accused.
67. See id at 318-319 n. 27 (dissenting opinion).
68. See id. at 310.
69. On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747 (1952).
70. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 42-52, On Lee v. United States, 343
U. S. 747 (1952) ; Brief for the United States, pp. 33-41, On Lee v. United
States, 343 U. S. 747 (1952).
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607

CONCLUSION

The majority of the federal courts have established the general
rule that an accuse&person under arrest should not have his silence
construed -against, him. D~viations from this rule would seem to
favor the experienced criminal. In view of. the commonly accepted
belief ihat a person under ar'rest has a right to remain silent, the
contrary ruile may be a trap for the ignorant, and can realistically
be considered, as compelling that accused to testify."' If a person's
silence while under arrest .can be used against him at the trial, the
I..f you say anycustomary warning should be.c.nged to read, .
thing, it. will be used againist you; if you do not.say anything, that
will be used againstyou,"'72
71. "See UcCaithy I Unifed'States, 25 F. 2d 298, 299 (6th Cir. 1928):
72; "McCarthy v. Unite'States, 25. F. 2d 298, 299 (6th- Cir. 192).

